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I. INTRODUCTION
"Constitutionalism is the name given to the trust which men
repose in the power of words engrossed on parchment to keep a
government in order."' The concept of constitutionalism implies
that government will conform its conduct to a law higher than or-
dinary legislation and that this body of higher law is set out in a
document called the constitution or some other form of fundamen-
tal law.2 Modern constitutionalism generally imposes two different
types of restraints upon the exercise of governmental powers: sepa-
ration of powers and individual rights.' By allocating powers
among various branches of government and diverse political units
and by guaranteeing certain fundamental rights against govern-
mental intrusion, modern constitutions act as important limita-
tions upon governmental power.
1. Constitutionalism, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 255 (1949).
2. This higher law need not be written down in a single document called "the constitu-
tion." Countries like England and Israel are governed in accordance with constitutional
principles even though neither country has a written constitution. Nevertheless, one can
find the English Constitution in such documents as the Magna Carta, the Petition of Right,
the Bill of Rights, the Habeas Corpus Act, and the Parliament Act. A. GOODIHART, THE BRIT-
ISH CONSTITUTION 1 (1946). Similarly, one can find the emerging Israeli Constitution in five
Basic Laws. Sager, Israel's Dilatory Constitution, 24 AM. J. COMP. L. 88, 93-99 (1976).
3. See Friedrich, Constitutions and Constitutionalism, 3 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 318, 319 (1968).
LATIN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
If the world were destroyed today and archaeologists of the
future were to discover only the texts of the constitutions of the
United States and the Latin American republics, the archaeologists
would undoubtedly conclude that constitutionalism was far more
developed in Latin America than in the United States. The U.S.
Constitution is a model of brevity, containing only seven original
articles and covering little more than five pages in the U.S. Code.
Even with respect to fundamental issues, such as judicial review,
the U.S. Constitution is strikingly omissive. Compared with Latin
American constitutions generally, and particularly when compared
to the recent Brazilian Constitution (with 245 permanent articles
and 70 transitional articles that cover 193 pages in the official ver-
sion) 4 the U.S. Constitution appears undeniably underdeveloped.
Yet, constitutional texts, like book covers, are deceptive. If archae-
ologists of the future were able to pierce through constitutional
form to actual practice, they would conclude that the brief, fre-
quently omissive U.S. Charter has worked extraordinarily well,
while the more elaborate and detailed charters found in Latin
America have generally worked poorly.
II. THE SUCCESS OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE UNITED STATES
During its 214 years as an independent nation, the United
States has had only two constitutions: the Articles of Confedera-
tion of 1777 and the Constitution of 1787. The former was an ab-
ject failure,6 while the latter has been a resounding success.
The mandate of those attending the U.S. Constitutional Con-
vention in Philadelphia in 1787 was simply to revise the Articles of
Confederation.' Fortunately, the Convention quickly became a
runaway constituent assembly that scrapped the Articles of Con-
federation and proceeded to draft a new constitution.
7
4. BRAZ. CONST. of 1988.
5. The reasons for the failure of the Articles of Confederation are apparent. The Arti-
cles failed to grant to the central government the powers essential for governance. The Con-
federation lacked both an executive and a judiciary branch. It had neither the power of
taxation, nor the power to enforce treaties. Nor did the Confederation have the power to
regulate interstate commerce. The Congress had only those powers expressly delegated to it
and no means of enforcing them. Ultimately, the inability of the Confederation to deal effec-
tively with pressing foreign and domestic issues led to the calling of a constituent assembly.
S. MORISON, H. COMMAGER, & W. LEUCHTENBURG, 1 THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
227-44 (7th ed. 1980) [hereinafter S. MORISON].
6. Id. at 244.
7. Not only did the Convention exceed its mandate, but it adopted an illegal ratifica-
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The U.S. Constitution, more so than any other written consti-
tution, has endured the test of time. That it has remained in force
for over two hundred years with essentially only fourteen amend-
ments8 is indicative of both its phenomenal success' and of the
enormous difficulty involved in amending it. That North Ameri-
cans have to resort to the French or Spanish languages to express
the exotic phenomenon of coup d'etat or golpe de estado is an-
other indication of the Constitution's success.
Perhaps the best evidence of the success of constitutionalism
in the United States is that constitutional precepts are widely
respected and obeyed. The United States has had a long-standing
commitment to the rule of law, whose basic postulate is that "we
are all to be governed by the same preestablished rules and not by
the whim of those charged with executing those rules."'10 The fed-
eral and state courts have played a major role in making the rule of
law meaningful through their decisions, and federal and state exec-
utives have almost always carried out court decisions. The prestige
of the U.S. Supreme Court is so great that its mandate is almost
invariably respected, even if it directs the President of the United
States to turn over tapes containing information that will cost him
the presidency," permits publication of purloined Vietnam War
documents that the government alleges would endanger national
security,12 or directs the return of a steel mill seized by the Presi-
tion procedure. Pursuant to the 13th Article of Confederation, the legislatures of all 13
states had to ratify amendments. The Framers of the 1787 Constitution bypassed the state
legislatures entirely; Article VII provided that approval by just 9 of 13 special ratifying con-
ventions would suffice. Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J.
453, 456 (1989).
8. Technically, the Congress has formally adopted 26 amendments to the U.S. Consti-
tution. The first 10 amendments (the Bill of Rights), however, were adopted in 1791, as a
necessary condition for ratification of the Constitution itself. The 21st amendment simply
repealed the 18th amendment, which had authorized the ill-advised experiment with
Prohibition.
9. No objective method exists for determining the success or failure of a constitution.
One approach is to view constitutions like plays: the longer they run, the greater their suc-
cess. In some countries, however, a constitution remains in force for as long as a particular
dictator remains in power. Surely, one would not want to regard a constitution as successful
merely because a dictator managed to stay in power for a long period or had institutional-
ized a system whereby he and his heirs were designated presidents for life. Similarly, merely
because a constitutionally elected government was overthrown by a coup d 'tat does not
imply that the constitution itself was defective.
10. Kurland, Curia Regis: Some Comments on the Divine Right of Kings and Courts
"To Say What the Law Is," 23 Asz. L. REv. 581, 582 (1981).
11. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).




dent in an effort to prevent a strike from disrupting the Korean
War effort.1 s The independence, forcefulness, and incorruptibility
with which the U.S. Supreme Court has played its role as guardian
of the Constitution has been unmatched by any other institution in
the world.
From the Constitution's inception, the people of the United
States have viewed their Constitution as a symbol of national po-
litical unity and as an embodiment of shared fundamental values.
A deep-seated belief that their Constitution is not only perfect but
sacrosanct has long been part of the U.S. political culture.1" Today,
most people overlook the original Charter's glaring imperfections.
Despite the ringing statement in the Declaration of Independence
that "all men are created equal,"15 the Constitution permitted
slavery, the most oppressive violation of human freedom, during
the Constitution's first seventy-six years. Not until 1866 did the
Congress adopt the thirteenth amendment abolishing slavery, and
then it did so only after the bloody Civil War that nearly severed
the Union. Although it established a democratic form of govern-
ment based upon popular sovereignty, the Constitution failed to
guarantee the right to vote. Instead, it relegated the issue of voter
qualifications to state law. Consequently, in all but five states, the
right to vote was originally limited to property-owning white
males.16 Only in 1870 was the Constitution amended to guarantee
suffrage for Black males,'" and only in 1920 was it amended to
13. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1962) (the Steel Seizure
case).
14. E. Corwin, The Worship of the Constitution, 1 CORWIN ON THE CONSTITUTION 47-55
(R. Loss ed. 1981); Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984); Lerner,
Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 YALE L.J. 1290 (1937); Levinson, "The Constitu-
tion" in American Civil Religion, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 123-25; Monaghan, Our Perfect Consti-
tution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 356 (1981). In the words of Professor Charles Miller: "The
Constitution, like the era from which it came, is an object of almost religious adoration ....
America has been a nation of Constitution-worshippers almost from the beginning ....
The Constitution has been accorded the status of the original, as well as the true, faith and
fundamental law." C. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 181-82 (1969)
(footnote omitted).
15. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
16. The exceptions were Georgia (restricted to taxpayers worth at least ten pounds or
"being of any mechanic trade"), New Hampshire (taxpayer), North Carolina (taxpayer), and
Pennsylvania (taxpayer or son of a freeholder). See W. ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVO-
LUTIONARY ERA 293-311 (R. Kimber & R. Kimber trans. 1980). The territory of Vermont
adopted the only constitution that extended suffrage to every adult male, regardless of
whether he was a taxpayer. Id. at 196.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
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guarantee women the right to vote.15 Moreover, only in the past
sixty years, through a piocess of judicial interpretation of the four-
teenth amendment known as selective incorporation, have most
(but not all) of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights been applied to
the states as well as to the federal government.'"
Although other shortcomings remain, the citizens of the
United States appear satisfied with their Constitution. Neverthe-
less, from time to time, they have been willing to make minor
changes in the Constitution, but only after the Civil War were they
willing to make major changes in its structure.2 0 At the present
time, public clamor for serious constitutional reform is virtually nil
(overlooking the rhetoric concerning an amendment to proscribe
flag burning).2"
III. THE FAILURE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN LATIN AMERICA
Unlike that of the United States, the Latin American experi-
ence with constitutionalism has generally been a failure. The di-
lemma of Latin American constitutionalism has been candidly cap-
tured by the paradoxical lament: "Our poor Constitution! So
virginal and so violated!" As one can see from Appendix A, since
independence the twenty Latin American republics have promul-
18. Id. amend. XIX.
19. The Supreme Court has specifically refused to incorporate into the 14th amend-
ment only three of the rights guaranteed by the first eight amendments. These are the sec-
ond amendment's right to bear arms, the fifth amendment's grand jury indictment require-
ment, and the seventh amendment's guarantee of a jury trial in all civil cases involving more
than $20. The Court has not yet had the opportunity to decide whether two other
rights-the third amendment's prohibition against quartering of troops in private homes
and the eight amendment's prohibition against excessive fines-are also incorporated in the
14th amendment. The Court has either explicitly or implicitly held that all the other guar-
antees of the Bill of Rights apply to the states with the same force as they apply to the
federal government. See 2 J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE, ch. 14, § 14.2, at 3-7 (1986) (with 1990 Supp.).
20. Adoption of the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments has been widely recognized as
accomplishing a major change in the reallocation of power between the states and the fed-
eral government. Arguably, a similar reallocation of power between the states and the fed-
eral government occurred during the 1930s when the "Court switch" resulted in a substan-
tial increase in the powers of the federal government. For a cogent argument that the New
Deal marked a significant modification of the institutional structure of the U.S. constitu-
tional system, see Ackerman, supra note 7, at 507-15.
21. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989), was the case that brought about the up-
roar. In Johnson, the Supreme Court held that burning the U.S. flag as a form of political
protest is protected under the first amendment. Id. For a discussion on calling another Con-
stitutional Convention, see W. MEAD, THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: PERSONALITIES,
PRINCIPLES, AND ISSUES 210-14 (1987).
LATIN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
gated some 253 constitutions, an average of 12.65 per country.
Three nations, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Venezuela,
have enacted more than twenty constitutions apiece. Constitution-
making has been called "Latin America's favorite indoor sport."
2
Today that sport appears to be as popular as ever. The Brazilian
Constitution of 1988 even includes two transitional articles that in-
sure future sporting events.2 '8 The latest player is Colombia, which
has recently convened a constituent assembly to consider Presi-
dent Gaviria's Draft Constitution.2 '
Focusing attention on the astonishing number of Latin Ameri-
can constitutions tends both to understate and to overstate the de-
gree of constitutional instability in the region. The 253 figure un-
derstates the degree of constitutional instability for three reasons.
First, Latin American constitutions are notoriously easy to amend,
and they are amended often. While some Latin American constitu-
tions have endured for substantial periods, they too have under-
gone such major modifications that they could easily be denomi-
nated as different constitutions. 5 Second, abrogated constitutions
are sometimes dusted off and repromulgated. Third, critical parts
of many Latin American constitutions are often suspended for long
periods by invocation of emergency devices such as the state of
siege. Conversely, the 253 figure also overstates the degree of con-
stitutional instability because many Latin American constitutions
22. L. HARRIS & V. ALBA, THE POLITICAL CULTURE AND BEHAVIOR OF LATIN AMERICA 54-
55 (1974).
23. Transitional article II mandates that a plebiscite be held on September 7, 1993, to
determine whether Brazil should remain a republic or become a constitutional monarchy
and whether Brazil should maintain presidentialism or adopt parliamentarianism. Transi-
tional article III mandates that after a five-year trial run, the Congress shall revise the Con-
stitution by the vote of an absolute majority of both houses in an unicameral session.
24. PRESIDENCIA DE LA REP(OBLICA, PROYECrO DE Acro REFORMATORIO DE LA CONSTITU-
C16N POLITICA DE COLOMBIA (Feb. 1991).
25. Argentina's 1853 Constitution was replaced from 1949 until 1955 by a Peronist Con-
stitution. R. FITZGIBBON, ARGENTINA: A CHRONOLOGY AND FACT BOOK 20-22 (1974). It was
also significantly amended by a series of institutional acts promulgated by several de facto
military regimes that moved in and out of power since 1930. See P. RAMELLA, DERECHO
CONSTITUCIONAL 45-55 (3d ed. 1986). Colombia's 1886 Constitution has been subjected to so
many major amendments that the government has to gather the amendments from time to
time and republish them separately in order to avoid confusion. W. GIssoN, THE CONSTITU-
TIONS OF COLOMBIA 358 (1948). Mexico's 1917 Constitution has been amended more than two
hundred times. The original and amended texts of the Mexican Constitution, as of 1983, are
placed side by side in Cuadro Comparatiuo entre el Texto Actual de la Constitucibn Polit-
ico de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos y el Original del 5 de Febrero de 1917, in NUEVO
DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL MEXICANO 487-622 (J. Massieu & D. Valad~s eds. 1983). The dif-
ference between the two versions is striking and profound.
1990]
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are virtually carbon copies of their predecessors.
Not only are Latin American constitutions short-lived, but
they are also often honored in the breach. As Professor William
Stokes has observed:
[T]he evidence indicates that the theory of Latin American con-
stitutions and the facts of politics are poles apart. Thus, more
often than not, the student can find the following contradic-
tions: instead of popular sovereignty, self-perpetuating oligar-
chy; instead of limited government, unlimited government; in-
stead of federalism, centralization; instead of separation of
powers and checks and balances, executive dictatorship; instead
of protection of individual rights and guarantees, governmental
violations of such rights; instead of peaceful, democratic proce-
dures, violent, anti-democratic procedures; instead of adminis-
trative responsibility and probity, administrative irresponsibility
and irregularities; instead of economic and social benefits, the
unavailability of funds to provide most of such benefits. 26
One important reason why many Latin American constitutions
have short lives is that Latin American governments so frequently
come to power through coups d'etat. As Appendix B -shows, be-
tween 1930 and 1990, the Latin American countries have had 139
extraconstitutional changes in government, an average of 6.95 per
country. In the 19th century, successful coups were even more fre-
quentY.2  Changes of government by extraconstitutional means are
so common that a number of Latin American constitutions quixoti-
cally provide for their continued existence even after a revolution
or coup d'$tat2 8 While enforcement is obviously problematic, such
provisions reflect the frustrations of constitution-makers whose
handiwork coups d'etat continually subvert. A more pragmatic ju-
ridical response has been the development of a de facto doctrine
for legitimating the acts of extraconstitutional governments.2 "
26. W. STOKES, LATIN AMERICAN POLITICs 458-59 (1959).
27. Between 1823 and 1899, 17 Latin American countries had 187 successful coups
d'tat, an average of 11 each. Computed from M. NEEDLER, THE PROBLEM oF DEMOCRACY IN
LATIN AMERICA 14 (1987).
28. For example, the first paragraph of article CCL of Venezuela's 1961 Constitution
provides: "This Constitution shall not lose its effect even if its observance is interrupted by
force or it is repealed by means other than those provided therein. In such eventuality,
every citizen, whether or not vested with authority, has the duty to collaborate in the rees-
tablishment of its effective validity." VENEZ. CONST. of 1961, art. CCL.
29. For thoughtful analyses of the de facto doctrine, see 2 G BIDART CAMPOS, TRATADO
ELEMENTAL DE DERECHO CONSTITUTIONAL ARGENTINO 536-37 (1989); Irizarry y Puente, The




On the other hand, a long period without a coup d'ktat do not
necessarily mean adherence to constitutional rule. Another com-
mon Latin American political institution is continuismo, by which
a regime remains in power through constitutional manipulation or
electoral fraud or both." Thus, the thirty-five years of apparent
constitutionalism between 1954 and 1989 in Paraguay and the
thirty-one years between 1930 and 1961 in the Dominican Republic
were actually periods of dictatorship by Generals Stroessner 3' and
Trujillo, 2 who blatantly rigged elections and ruthlessly suppressed
political opposition while maintaining the trappings of constitu-
tional rule. Similar examples of continuismo prevailed in Haiti
under the Duvaliers 3 and in Nicaragua under the Somozas3 4
Why has constitutionalism worked so well in the United
States and so poorly in Latin America? There is no single nor sim-
ple answer to this question, and any explanation must be tentative.
This Article will first attempt to explain why constitutionalism has
worked so well in the United States.
IV. AN EXPLANATION OF THE SUCCESS OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
THE UNITED STATES
A. Experience with Constitutionalism and Self-Government
In contradistinction to the Latin American colonies, the North
American colonies had substantial experience with both constitu-
tionalism and self-government. Prior to 1776, the North Americans
were subjects of a constitutional monarchy and enjoyed the "liber-
ties, franchises, and immunities" of English citizens.3 5 The English
constitutional tradition dates back to the limitations on royal au-
thority exacted from King John in the Magna Carta of 1215. These
rights and liberties were later supplemented by the Petition of
Right in 1629, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, and the Bill of
30. K. KARST & K. ROSENN, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 184 (1975) [here-
inafter K KARST].
31. See P. LEWIS, PARAGUAY UNDER STROESSNER (1980).
32. See R. CRASSWELLER, TRUJILLO (1966).
33. See E. ABBOT, HAITI (1988).
34. See Falcoff, Sornoza, Sandino, and the United States, in THE CONTINUING CRISIS:
U.S. POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 297, 310-17 (M. Falcoff & R. Royal eds.
1987).




Rights of 1689.8 The American colonists were distinctly aware of
the constitutional constraints upon the powers of English govern-
ments and, when convenient, relied liberally upon their privileges
and rights as Englishmen in their disputes with the Crown.
Prior to independence, the English colonists had considerable
experience with constitutional self-government. Since the English
colonies were often founded as commercial enterprises, they were
managed under charters from the Crown.3 7 These charters fre-
quently provided that the colonies could enact their own laws, pro-
vided these laws were "reasonable" and "not contrary to the laws
of the Kingdom of England."38 The English Privy Council regu-
larly invalidated acts of the colonial legislatures for violations of
colonial charters or the laws of England.89 These charters com-
bined many of the characteristics of a corporate charter and a con-
stitution. Significantly, after independence, Rhode Island, Massa-
chusetts, and Connecticut, with slight modifications, retained their
colonial charters as their constitutions. Most colonial assemblies,
however, transformed themselves into congresses that drafted and
secured popular approval of democratic state constitutions. Many
important provisions in the U.S. Constitution were modeled on
provisions of these state constitutions. Thus, in a real sense, the
U.S. Constitution was the product of a people with a long and ac-
tive tradition of constitutionalism.
The English colonies' experience with self-government was de-
rived from their own legislatures and town governments. The colo-
nial legislatures, which began in Virginia in 1619, consisted of two
houses: a popularly elected lower house and an upper house chosen
by the Crown or Governor. 1 Suffrage was far more widespread in
the English colonies than in England or other European coun-
tries."2 The colonists serving in the upper houses, usually called the
Governor's Council, 43 played a prominent role in governing the En-
36. See A. HowARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE 9-10 (1968).
37. M. CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 39 (1971).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 39-40.
40. D. LUTZ, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 6 (1988).
41. See S. MORISON, supra note 5, at 42.
42. The English rule extending the right to vote to men owning enough land to earn an
annual rent of at least 40 shillings (generally about 50 acres) enfranchised only 2 to 6% of
adult males in England. In the colonies, however, where land was cheap, the English suf-
frage rule enfranchised 50 to 65% of adult white males during the 1780s. D. LUTZ, supra
note 40, at 51, 75.
43. See S. MORISON, supra note 5, at 42.
[Vol. 22:1
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glish colonies, for in addition to their legislative duties, they per-
formed the executive functions of advising the Governor and the
judicial functions of the highest courts of appeals in the colonies."
Thus, by the time of independence, the English colonies had more
than 150 years of experience with representative government. In a
very real sense, they were thirteen political communities, united by
a common language, common values, the common law, and a com-
mon enemy. "No taxation without representation" was an English
constitutional principle utilized to justify colonial independence. "5
Not only were the colonists prepared to govern themselves, but
they were prepared to fight for the privilege of doing so without
interference from the English Crown.
B. The Delicate Balance between a Government with Ade-
quate but Limited Powers
Critical to the success of constitutional democracy is creating a
government strong enough to accomplish its aims, while at the
same time maintaining appropriate limitations on governmental
power. Not only must constitutions afford governments sufficient
power to govern effectively, but they must also curtail governmen-
tal power in order to protect individual freedoms. James Madison
put his pen precisely upon the problem: "In framing a government,
which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty
lies in this: You must first enable the government to control the
governed; and in the next place, oblige it to control itself."4
One of the principal reasons the U.S. Constitution has worked
so well is that the Framers succeeded in devising an ingenious so-
lution to this dilemma. The Framers used the concept of federal-
ism to divide governmental power vertically between the states and
the national government. The national government's powers were
limited to those delegated to it in the constitutional text and those
that could be reasonably implied therefrom, as well as those neces-
sary and proper for executing governmental duties."7 All other
powers were either reserved to the states or to the people. The task
44. An Ordinance and Constitution of the Treasurer Council, and Company in Eng-
land, for a Council of State and General Assembly, reprinted in 1 COLONY LAWS OF VIR-
GINIA 1619-1600, 110-12 (1978).
45. A. HOWARD, supra note 36, at 139-50.
46. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 399 (J. Madison) (J. Hamilton ed. 1892).
47. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (the
commerce clause), cl. 18 (the necessary and proper clause), amend. X.
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of governing was thus left largely to the states and their own legal
systems.
The Framers' solution was an unique scheme for fragmenting
governmental power based upon three important concepts: federal-
ism, separation of powers, and a system of checks and balances.
The Framers utilized the concept of separation of powers to divide
national governmental power horizontally among the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches. These three compartments, how-
ever, were never intended to be watertight. Considerable overlap
was deliberately built into this flexible notion of separation of pow-
ers to facilitate an ingenious, internal system of checks and bal-
ances, designed to prevent any of the three branches of the na-
tional government from becoming too powerful. A free press,
guaranteed by the first amendment, and the ballot box serve as the
ultimate checks against abuse of governmental power.
C. The Originality of the U.S. Constitution
The U.S. Constitution is an autochthonic document. Although
it displays the influence of European theorists like Locke, Rous-
seau, and Montesquieu,'I as well as 776 years of English constitu-
tional tradition, the U.S. Constitution is an original creation, spe-
cially tailored to fit the fundamental values of American society.
The Framers deliberately (and perhaps unintentionally)'9 turned
their backs on European models and invented a new system of gov-
ernment with American conditions in mind. Despite its short
length, the U.S. Constitution contains a great many important in-
novations, such as presidentialism, federalism, separation of pow-
ers, and a complex scheme of checks and balances. It can be said of
the United States, just as it was said of ancient Athens: "Our con-
stitution does not copy the laws of neighbouring states; we are
rather a pattern to others than imitators ourselves." 50
48. See D. LUTZ, supra note 40, at 139-49.
49. In instituting separation of powers as a means of checking the powers of the various
branches of government, the Framers relied heavily on Montesquieu's description of the
British constitutional system. Commentators argue that Montesquieu's depiction had little
to do with reality; consequently, the attempt to copy the English model resulted in felicitous
innovation. A. HOWARD, supra note 36, at 219. But see S. MORISON, supra note 5, at 210-11.
50. THUCYDIDES, THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF THUcYDIDES: THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR
104 (1951) (the Funeral Oration of Pericles).
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D. The Flexibility of the U.S. Constitution
The U.S. constitutional system has displayed an unusual abil-
ity to adapt to the changing needs of the country. Unlike many
Latin American Constitutions that include a great many detailed
rules normally found in statutes or codes, the U.S. Constitution
sets forth the broad outlines of government only in general terms.
Moreover, the text is rich in omissions, many of them deliberate.
The importance of not attempting to turn constitutional text into
a governmental straitjacket was made forcefully by Hamilton:
[N]ations pay little regard to rules and maxims calculated in
their very nature to run counter to the necessities of society.
Wise politicians will be cautious about fettering the government
with restrictions that cannot be observed, because they know
that every breach of the fundamental laws, though dictated by
necessity, impairs that sacred reverence which ought to be main-
tained in the breast of rulers towards the constitution of a coun-
try, and forms a precedent for other breaches where the same
plea of necessity does not exist at all, or is less urgent and
palpable."
The flexibility of the U.S. Constitution is also due to the inclusion
of a number of general clauses, such as the due process,"2 equal
protection,53 and contract clauses, 4 whose presence has provided
the courts with conveniently open-ended textual points of depar-
ture for keeping the Constitution relevant in our rapidly evolving
society.55
51. THE FEDERALIST No. 25, at 213 (A. Hamilton, J. Madison, & J. Jay) (B.F. Wright ed.
1961).
52. U.S. CONST. art. XIV.
53. Id.
54. Id. art. I, § 10.
55. The Supreme Court occasionally acknowledges that the meaning of these open-en-
ded clauses changes over time. For example, Justice Douglas, in his opinion for the Court in
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, candidly admitted:
[TIhe Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political theory of a partic-
ular era. In determining what lines are unconstitutionally discriminatory, we
have never been confined to historic notions of equality, any more than we have
restricted due process to a fixed catalogue of what was at a given time deemed to
be the limits of fundamental rights .... Notions of what constitutes equal
treatment for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do change.
383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966) (emphasis in original).
Observers often criticize the Court for interpreting the Constitution in ways that keep it
behind, ahead, or tangential to societal evolution. For a discussion of the Court's tradition
and future, see G. WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 460-66 (1988).
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E. The Critical Role of an Independent Judiciary with a
Common Law Tradition
The role of the courts in insuring the vitality and effective
functioning of the U.S. Constitution has been critical. In the semi-
nal case of U.S. constitutional law, Marbury v. Madison,56 Chief
Justice John Marshall established the seemingly obvious yet criti-
cal proposition that the Constitution is law, a rule of decision en-
forceable by the courts. This proposition, to a considerable extent,
followed naturally from the experience of invalidation of colonial
legislation because it was ultra vires or conflicted with colonial
charters and principles of English law. Moreover, English judges
occasionally maintained that the common law, based upon princi-
ples of right reason and natural reason, could control acts of the
legislature. 7
U.S. judges are trained in the common law tradition, which
has been important to the success of constitutionalism in the
United States. In this tradition, the real oracles of the law are the
judges rather than the legislature or scholars." The power of judi-
cial review in the United States is completely decentralized; all
courts, be they state of federal, trial or appellate, are expected to
determine the constitutionality of laws or decrees whenever such
an issue is presented in cases before them. Common law judges
tend to obscure constitutional texts with judicial gloss, whose
meaning can be understood in light of the specific facts of the case
in which it was laid down. In the common law tradition, with its
doctrine of stare decisis, judicial opinions interpreting the Consti-
tution, particularly those of the U.S. Supreme Court, rapidly as-
sume greater importance than the text itself. Stare decisis is less
rigidly followed in constitutional law than in other areas, and the
U.S. Supreme Court has not infrequently overruled precedents
that it later deemed to be wrong or obsolete. More frequently, the
courts change constitutional doctrine gradually by distinguishing
existing precedents on their facts. As Professor Damaska has ob-
served, "The flexibility of case-law has allowed the American con-
stitutional system to absorb dramatic changes, such as the depar-
ture from strong laissez-faire positions - changes which would in
more formal and textually centered systems have required a new
56. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
57. M CAPPELLETTI, supra note 37, at 36-41.
58. See J. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW ii-Xvi (1968).
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Founding instrument, perhaps even a revolution."59
The common law tradition has had a decided procedural ad-
vantage over the civil law tradition with respect to controlling un-
constitutional governmental action and preserving individual
rights. Because common law rights were largely a function of reme-
dies, the common law came fully equipped with a panoply of pro-
cedural devices, such as the contempt power and the writs of man-
damus, prohibition, habeas corpus, injunction, and quo warranto
that were enormously useful in checking unconstitutional govern-
mental action and in preserving constitutional rights. The doctrine
of stare decisis and the more modern procedural device of the class
action have obviated the need for numerous individual lawsuits to
preserve one's constitutional rights. Moreover, unlike many Latin
American constitutions, the U.S. Constitution generally does not
impose affirmative duties on the government to promote individual
rights or economic interests. Rather, it prohibits governmental ac-
tions that interfere with constitutionally protected rights. As the
U.S. Supreme Court discovered when it imposed the affirmative
duty on school boards to convert segregated schools into unitary,
nondiscriminatory school systems rather than merely ceasing seg-
regation,60 enforcement of affirmative duties to promote individual
or group interests is far more difficult for the judiciary than en-
forcement of prohibitions on certain government actions.
The Framers were keenly aware of the need for an indepen-
dent judiciary. One of the most vocal complaints of the American
colonists against the Crown was the lack of judicial independence.
After 1761, colonial judges, unlike judges in England, served at the
pleasure of the King. Dissatisfaction with the quality of justice
rendered by a dependent judiciary was manifested in the Declara-
tion of Independence, which included among the list of royal
abuses: "He has obstructed the Administration of Justice, by refus-
ing his Assent to Laws for establishing Judiciary powers. He has
made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their
offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries.""1 From the
start, the United States has placed a high priority upon creating
and maintaining an independent judiciary. The Framers attempted
to guarantee judicial independence by protecting judicial compen-
59. Damaska, Reflections on American Constitutionalism, in U.S. LAW IN AN ERA OF
DEMOCRATIZATION 421, 428 (J. Hazard & W. Wagner eds. 1990) (Supp. to 38 AM. J. COMP. L.).
60. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 20 (1971).
61. The Declaration of Independence paras. 10, 11 (U.S. 1776).
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sation from diminution and by guaranteeing lifetime tenure,6"2 but
what has ultimately made those guarantees effective is a deep
seated commitment in the U.S. political tradition to the value of
judicial independence.
F. Creation of an Effective Common Market
The U.S. Constitution effectively created a common market.
The Framers regarded the nation as a single economic unit and
specifically prohibited the states from imposing barriers to free
trade among themselves.6 3 The courts have regularly invalidated
state legislation that protects the businesses of one state from free
competition with businesses from other states."' As Justice Bren-
nan has written:
The few simple words of the Commerce Clause - "The
Congress shall have the power . . . to regulate Commerce ...
among the several States . . ." - reflected a central concern of
the Framers that was an immediate reason for calling the Con-
stitutional Convention: the conviction that in order to succeed,
the new union would have to avoid the tendencies toward eco-
nomic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colo-
nies and later among the States under the Articles of Confedera-
tion . . .. The Commerce Clause has accordingly been
interpreted by this Court not only as an authorization for con-
gressional action, but also, even in the absence of a conflicting
federal statute, as a restriction on permissible state regulation. 5
From inception, therefore, the United States was able to achieve
economies of scale and other economic benefits of a common mar-
ket without having to undergo the slow, difficult negotiating pro-
cess necessary to achieve economic integration among independent
political entities.
G. Equality and Social Revolution in the United States
The United States experienced a social revolution in 1776.
The existing power structure was dramatically rearranged. Large
62. See Ziskind, Judicial Tenure in the American Constitution: English and American
Precedents, 1969 SuP. CT. Rav. 135.
63. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
64. E.g., Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
65. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979).
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Tory and Loyalist landholdings were confiscated, divided up into
small farms, and either sold or given to individual farmers."6 En-
glish laws on property transmission were modified to eliminate re-
straints on free alienation. De Tocqueville observed that:
[Aifter a lapse of a little more than sixty years, the aspect of
society is totally altered; the families of the great landed propri-
etors are almost all commingled with the general mass. . .. The
last trace of hereditary ranks and distinctions is destroyed; the
law of partition has reduced all to one level."
The Founding Fathers were convinced that the primary de-
fense of the republic they had created lay in the "virtue" of its
people. By virtue they meant the willingness of individuals to
subordinate their private interests to the public welfare. As John
Adams explained:
IP]ublic virtue is the only foundation of republics. There must
be a positive passion for the public good, the public interest,
honor, power, and glory, established in the minds of the people,
or there can be no republican government, nor any real liberty,
and this public passion must be superior to all private
passions."
Widespread land ownership and public education were
thought to be two of the best techniques for inculcating virtue in
the citizenry. Working their own land would give people a stake in
the community and enable them to see how their private interests
were bound up with the common good. A nation of yeoman farm-
ers was deemed to be a nation of naturally virtuous citizens. More-
over, a democracy founded on the principle of popular sovereignty
required an educated citizenry. People can be taught to value lib-
erty and the common welfare. In colonial times, New England es-
tablished a system of free public education,"0 and, by the middle of
the 19th century, a system of free elementary and secondary edu-
cation had spread to the other parts of the country. 1 Since the
United States possessed a seemingly endless supply of public
lands, Congress enacted legislation (prior to adoption of the Con-
66. S- MORISON, supra note 5, at 214.
67. 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 53 (P. Bradley ed. 1954).
68. Id.
69. D. FARBER & S. SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 13 (1990).
70. S. MORISON, supra note 5, at 57-58.
71. Id. at 460-61.
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stitution) to permit easy purchase of unallocated lands and to
dedicate certain sections for educational purposes.
72
Thus, the United States underwent a true social revolution.
Great estates were generally divided, and land was widely distrib-
uted among those willing to work it. The United States deliber-
ately rejected titles of nobility and a society formally divided by
class.73 The aspect of U.S. society that made the greatest impres-
sion on a sophisticated European observer like de Tocqueville was
"the general equality of condition among the people."74 While this
equality was obviously imperfect, the United States began with a
society far more egalitarian than did any of the Latin American or
European nations.
H. The Lack of Militarism
Unlike Latin America, the United States never developed a
tradition of militarism or a military class. The War for Indepen-
dence lasted only eight years (from the first shots fired at Concord
and Lexington, April 19, 1775, to the Treaty of Paris, September 3,
1783). At war's end, Washington's army quickly disbanded.
The tradition of civilian control over the military and distrust
of standing armies preceded the Constitution. Among the King's
abuses of power set forth in the Declaration of Independence were:
"He has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies, with-
out the Consent of our Legislature. He has affected to render the
Military independent of and superior to the Civil power. '75 While
some Framers wanted a standing army and successfully conferred
upon Congress the power to raise an army, many of the Framers
regarded a standing army as a huge threat to liberty. Although the
precise meaning of the second amendment remains hotly con-
tested, it was adopted to preserve the state militia and the right to
bear arms as a means of insuring liberty and preventing the central
government's army from having a weapons monopoly.e
72. The Land Ordinance of 1785, adopted by the Continental Congress, divided public
lands in townships six miles square, and subdivided into 36 sections of 640 acres each. Land
offices were established to sell public lands, and one section of each township was reserved
for maintenance of public schools. This Ordinance remained the basis for public land policy
when the Homestead Act of 1862 was enacted. Id. at 231-32.
73. Id. at 214.
74. 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 67, at 3.
75. The Declaration of Independence paras. 13, 14 (U.S. 1776).
76. See Hardy, Armed Citizens, Citizen Armies: Toward a Jurisprudence of the Sec-
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When the Constitution was promulgated in 1789, the entire
U.S. army consisted of only 672 men.7 Despite a decade of war
threats, by 1800 the army had grown to only 3,429 men. 8 Real mil-
itary power lay with citizenry in the form of the state militia
reserves, which could be mobilized to meet emergencies. Absence
of a professional military class made it relatively easy to establish
the unbroken tradition of civilian control over the military.
. The Economic Payoff
As Seymour Lipset has pointed out, the legitimacy of any con-
stitutional system in a new state must ultimately survive a prag-
matic test: Does the system have a substantial economic payoff?.
79
The United States has enjoyed spectacular economic success,
which, to a large extent, can be traced to the dominant cultural
value system brought by the Puritans from England, a value sys-
tem that emphasized hard work and saving as moral virtues.8 0 The
inhabitants of the United States have participated in a most im-
pressive sustained economic growth, the benefits of which have
been relatively widely dispersed throughout the society. They have
also participated in a democratic system that operates under the
rule of law, where elections are generally regarded as honest, where
regimes peaceably hand over the reins of government to successful
opposition parties and where coup d'etat is unknown. Although
veneration for the Constitution may ultimately have been a prod-
uct of the nation's economic and political success, the Constitution
has greatly contributed to that success by providing a viable insti-
tutional framework and a symbol for effective government.
J. The Institutionalization of Charismatic Leadership
Finally, one should not discount the substantial role that good
luck played in the American constitutional process. Many of the
Framers never expected the Constitution to work, and many would
ond Amendment, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 559, 599-615 (1986); Kates, Handgun Prohibi-
tion and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 211-25
(1983). See also Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989).
77. S. LIPSET, THE FIRST NEW NATION: THE UNITED STATES IN HISTORICAL AND COMPARA-
TIVE PERSPECTIVE 106 (1967).
78. Id.
79, Id. at 52.
80. S. MoRIsoN, supra note 5, at 51.
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have preferred a different system had they not been forced to
make compromises to win political acceptance."1 One of the most
obvious aspects of the good fortune of the United States was the
example set by its first president George Washington, who was
idolized during his own lifetime as the father of the American
Revolution. His strong personal charisma legitimated the new gov-
ernment, just as Mao's did in China and Fidel's did in Cuba.82 For-
tunately, for the history of constitutionalism in the United States,
Washington had no desire to be a king or a dictator. Although he
wished to retire after one term in office, conflict between the Jef-
fersonians and Hamiltonians made it necessary for him to serve
two terms. Washington set the precedent of being the first head of
a modern state to turn over the reins of government to a duly
elected successor. 83 Washington's prestige was great enough to
keep the new nation from splintering into factionalism. Because he
was committed to constitutional government and had the good
sense and health to retire rather than to die in office, Washington
facilitated the institutionalization of charismatic legitimacy along
the rational-legal lines established by the Constitution.
The United States was also very fortunate that Washington's
successor, John Adams, followed Washington's precedent and
peaceably turned over the reins of government to the Jeffersoni-
ans, his victorious political opponents. To be sure, Adams did pack
the judiciary with members of his Federalist party,84 but he va-
cated the presidency. Luckily for the United States, a willingness
to compromise and a spirit of moderation were present from the
very start of independent government.
V. CAUSES OF THE FAILURE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN LATIN
AMERICA
Any explanation for the lack of success of constitutionalism in
Latin America must be more tentative and qualified when com-
pared with the constitutional experience of the United States.
Latin America consists of twenty nations, each with its own histor-
ical experience. The differences among them are enormous. Some
81. D. SMITH, THE CONVENTION AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE POLITICAL IDEAS OF THE
FOUNDING FATHERS 35-55 (1987).
82. S. LIPSET, supra note 77, at 25.
83. Id. at 24.
84. S. MORISON, supra note 5, at 345.
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of the indicia of lack of success, such as frequent coups d'etat and
constant changes in constitutions, can be misleading. Latin Ameri-
can coups often signify only a change in a few government figures
rather than any major institutional changes. The differences be-
tween the old and new constitutions are often essentially cosmetic.
Moreover, constitutionalism has been successful for long periods in
certain Latin American countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, and Uruguay.
A. The Absence of Real Revolutionary Change
One of the paradoxes of Latin American history is that despite
the large numbers of extraconstitutional changes in governments,
with the exceptions of Cuba, Mexico, and the partial exception of
Bolivia, Latin American countries have never undergone real social
revolutions. The Wars of Independence never effectuated a revolu-
tion in the sense of restructuring the wealth, political power, and
the social system-.8 5 A creole elite, loyal to the deposed Spanish
king, Ferdinand VII, initiated rebellions. The rebellions were trig-
gered not so much by a desire for democratic self-government, but
by a legitimacy crisis created by Napoleon's invasion of Spain in
1808 and subsequent placement of his brother Joseph on the Span-
ish throne.8 Joseph had no royal blood, and the creole revolution-
aries, like their counterparts in Spain, refused to accept a com-
moner as their king.87 Many of them organized juntas to govern in
the name of the deposed Ferdinand.8  In 1814, when Ferdinand re-
turned to the Spanish throne, abrogated the liberal 1812 Constitu-
tion of Cadiz, and assumed absolutist powers, many. creoles laid
down their arms. Ironically, it was Ferdinand's sudden acceptance
of the liberal 1812 Constitution and the abolition of the Inquisition
that caused many conservative creoles to fight for independence
from Spain.89 Independence became "a conservative goal, a means
of upholding traditional values and social codes."90
The wealth, power, and privileges of the aristocracy have per-
sisted largely intact since independence in Latin America. Whereas
85. Blanksten, Revolutions, in GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA 119, 123-46
(H. Davis ed. 1958).
86. T. SKIDMORE & P. SMITH, MODERN LATIN AMERICA 29 (2d ed. 1989).
87. Id
88. Id.
89. Id. at 34.
90. Id. at 33.
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land ownership has been relatively widespread in the United
States, land ownership has remained highly concentrated in most
parts of Latin America.91 Perhaps the most significant legacy of
Spanish and Portuguese colonialism in Latin America was the lati-
fundia,92 the large estate that has served as a political power base
for the oligarchies that have controlled many Latin American
countries. 9 3 In Latin America, oligopolistic control over land pro-
duced a highly stratified rural society, with a tiny upper class, vir-
tually no middle class, and a huge lower class. The scarcity of ara-
ble land outside the large estates tied labor to the estates and
made landless agricultural workers dependent upon the landowner
for protection and support. To the extent these workers participate
in the political process, they do so at the mandate of their patr6n,
the landowner.
9 4
As Octavio Paz has observed, the liberal democratic principles
expressed in the U.S. Constitution corresponded to historical
reality,
for they were an expression of the rise of the bourgeoisie ...
and the destruction of the old regime. In Spanish America they
merely served as modern trappings for the survivals of the colo-
nial system. This liberal, democratic ideology, far from expres-
sing our concrete historical situation, disguised it, and the politi-
cal lie established itself almost constitutionally."
B. Inexperience with Self-Government
Unlike the English colonies, the Spanish and Portuguese colo-
nies had little experience with self-government. Iberian rule was
91. K. KARST, supra note 30, at 242-43.
92. Christensen, Latin America: The Land and People, in GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 85, at 26, 28.
93. Until the 20th century, the basis of oligarchy in Latin America had been the mo-
nopolization of, and access to, land ownership. In fact, the most significant feature of the
history of land tenure in Latin America until very recent decades had been the spread of the
large estate into frontier areas, or the aggrandizement of established estates, if not for con-
trol over cultivable lands or scarce water rights, then for control of scarce labor, agricultural
manpower. In Latin America, the 19th century may be viewed as a period of acceleration in
the rate of estate formation and estate owners' control over manpower. S. STEIN & B. STEIN,
THE COLONIAL HERITAGE OF LATIN AMERICA 138 (1970).
94. Ch*ristensen, A Changing Society and Economy, in GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN
LATIN AMERICA, supra note 85, at 53.
95. 0. PAZ, THE LABYRINTH OF SOLITUDE: LIFE AND THOUGHT IN MEXICO 122 (L. Kemp,
Y. Milos, & R. Belash trans. 1985).
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paternalistic and absolutist. Except at the minor levels, govern-
ment officials were almost always peninsulares sent from Iberia
rather than creoles born in Latin America.96 Virtually the sole rep-
resentation for those born in the Iberian colonies was the cabildos
(cermaras in Portuguese), the city or town councils. These councils,
however, quickly lost the little power and autonomy that they had
enjoyed. They became petty oligarchies rather than representative
institutions.7 As the most famous of creole leaders, Sim6n Bolivar,
lamented, "We were left in a state of permanent childhood." 8
Bolivar was keenly aware of the great gap between the United
States and Latin America with respect to their abilities to govern
themselves. In his famous address to the Congress at Angostura in
1819, Bolivar explained why the U.S. constitutional model would
not work in Venezuela:
The more I admire the excellence of the federal Constitu-
tion of [the United States], the more I am convinced of the im-
possibility of its application to our state. And, to my way of
thinking, it is a marvel that its prototype in North America en-
dures so successfully and has not been overthrown at the first
sign of adversity or danger. Although the people of North
America are a singular model of political virtue and moral recti-
tude; although that nation was cradled in liberty, reared on free-
dom, and maintained by liberty alone; and - I must reveal eve-
rything - although those people, so lacking in many respects,
are unique in the history of mankind, it is a marvel, I repeat,
that so weak and complicated a government as the federal sys-
tem has managed to govern them in the difficult and trying cir-
cumstances of their past. But, regardless of the effectiveness of
this form of government with respect to North America, I must
say that it has never for a moment entered my mind to compare
the position and character of two states as dissimilar as the En-
glish-American and the Spanish-American. Would it not be
most difficult to apply to Spain the English system of political,
civil, and religious liberty? Hence, it would be even more diffi-
cult to adapt to Venezuela the laws of North America."
96. "In the long list of over seven hundred and fifty viceroys, governors, and presidents
of audiencias, less than twenty creoles appear." C. JANE, LIBERTY AND DESPOTISM IN SPANISH
AMERICA 7 (1929).
97. C. HARING, THE SPANISH EMPIRE IN AMERICA 165 (1963).
98. R HUMPHREYS, The Fall o/the Spanish American Empire, in TRADITION AND RE-
VOLT IN SPANISH AMERICA AND OTHER ESSAYS 83 (1969).
99. Bolivar, Address Delivered at the Inauguration of the Second National Congress of
Venezuela, reprinted in I SELECTED WRITINGS OF BOLIVAR 173, 179 (H. Bierck 2d ed. 1951).
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Yet, despite the differences in cultures and the lack of prepared-
ness for self-government, the fascination with the kind of constitu-
tional democracy implanted in the United States has persisted in
Latin America, to a large degree as an aspirational model.
C. The Imported Flavor of Latin American Constitutions
Latin American constitutions are frequently criticized for un-
realistically borrowing institutions from Europe and the United
States without serious consideration of their suitability for implan-
tation on Latin American soil. While there is obviously some truth
to such criticism, the point is generally overstated. Latin American
constitutions reflect inherent tensions between fundamentally con-
flicting traditions that continue to coexist in Latin American soci-
ety. On the one hand, they reflect the liberal, democratic tradition
consciously imported from France and the United States. 00 On the
other hand, they also reflect the authoritarian, corporatist, and
elitist tradition inherited from Spain and Portugal.0 1 The strong
influence of the Catholic Church and the military reinforce this
tradition, which was also present in the political tradition of the
native Indian population. Presidents are often granted incredibly
broad powers to make policy and laws and to suspend constitu-
tional guarantees by invoking a state of siege, one of the most
abused legal institutions in Latin America.1 02 Built into almost all
100. The Latin American constitution most closely modeled after that of the United
States is Argentina's Constitution of 1853. Yet, it is far from being an exact copy. See S.
AMADEO, ARGENTINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (E. Patterson ed. 1943). -The U.S. model also
heavily influenced the Brazilian Constitution of 1891. H. JAMES, THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYS-
TEM OF BRAZIL 10 (1923).
To a considerable extent, U.S. and French influence was channeled through the liberal
1812 Spanish Constitution of Chdiz, which heavily influenced the 1821 Constitution of Gran
Colombia, the 1830 and 1832 Constitutions of New Granada, the 1830 Constitution of Vene-
zuela, the 1823 and 1828 Constitutions of Peru, the Argentine Constitution of 1826, the
Uruguayan Constitution of 1830, and the Chilean Constitution of 1828. Safford, Politics,
Ideology and Society, in SPANISH AMERICA AFTER INDEPENDENCE, C. 1820-c. 1870, 48, 62 (L.
Bethell ed. 1987).
101. Davis, The Political Experience of Latin America, in GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 85, at 10; Safford, supra note 100, at 48.
102. Secretary General Javier P~rez de Cutllar, in an address to the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights on February 15, 1983, stated: "[I] consider that it should be
one of the priority issues on the international human rights agenda to strive to make sure
that situations of emergency are only resorted to in cases of absolute need." Ramcharan,
The Role of International Bodies in the Implementation and Enforcement of Humanita-
rian Law and Human Rights Law in Non-International Armed Conflicts, 33 AM. U.L. REV.
99, 105 (1983). See also INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, STATES OF EMERGENCY:
THEIR IMPACT ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1983).
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Latin American constitutions are provisions that permit both de-
mocracy and dictatorship. 103 The cycle of democratic and dictato-
rial regimes that most Latin American countries have experienced
reflects the still unresolved tension between Latin America's two
conflicting political traditions.
D. The Difficulties in Establishing the Rule of Law
Unlike the United States, which began with a strong commit-
ment to the rule of law,104 Latin America began with a traditional
disrespect for law. After independence this disrespect degenerated
into anarchy in many areas. While the English colonies were
largely governed by the laws enacted by their own legislatures and
the established common law, the Spanish and Portuguese colonies
were governed by laws promulgated for them by the Spanish and
Portuguese Crowns.0 5 Much of this legislation was confused and
contradictory. The preamble to the Argentine decree, establishing
a legislative drafting commission after the 1852 overthrow of dicta-
tor Rosas by General Urquiza, at the battle of Caseros, noted that
the legislation Argentina inherited from Spain
contains laws passed during a period of time extending over
many centuries unknown to the people on whom they are bind-
ing, stored away in court archives or in the private libraries of a
few individuals fortunate enough to possess them as priceless
curiosities; society at large, and very often jurisconsults and the
judges themselves, are ignorant of their very existence .
The Brazilian legislation was even more confused and more diffi-
cult to discern than that in the Spanish colonies.'0 7
In the Latin American colonies, patrimonialism produced
widespread corruption, an incredible penchant for bureaucratic red
tape, and a highly unpredictable and personal legal system. 0 8
Since government positions were regarded as personal privileges
granted or purchased from the Crown, notions of public service
and public trust were nonexistent. Colonial administrators viewed
103. See D. VALADtS, LA DICTADURA CONSTITUCIONAL EN AMRICA LATINA (1974).
104. See 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 67, at 73-74.
105. See Rosenn, Brazil's Legal Culture: The Jeito Revisited, I FLA. INT'L L.J. 1, 9
(1984).
106. Eder, Introduction, THE ARGENTINE CIVIL CODE xxi-xxii (F. Joannini trans. 1917).
107. See Rosenn, supra note 105, at 10-12.
108. Id.
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their offices as a franchise for private gain. Citizens could claim no
rights in patrimonial regimes. 10 9 What they could ask for were fa-
vors, which were dispensed on a personal basis or sold. 110 This pa-
trimonialist legacy has made implantation of the rule of law ex-
tremely difficult in Latin America.
It has also been difficult to treat Latin American constitutions
as law in the sense of being a rule of decision for courts. This is
because Latin American constitutions typically contain a substan-
tial number of aspirational or utopian provisions that are either
impossible or extremely difficult to enforce. Some of these provi-
sions contain social rights that seem far more appropriate as part
of a political platform or a sermon than in a constitution. Rela-
tively common are Catholic-oriented provisions designed to protect
the family and to render a multitude of sins like divorce and usury
unconstitutional."' In inflationary economies and societies where
marriages break up at rates similar to those in other countries,
such provisions inevitably produce widespread constitutional disre-
spect. Since World War I, Latin American constitutions have also
included an impressive amount of secular, social welfare legislation
designed to protect workers, the underprivileged, or the national
economy. For example, Venezuela's Constitution provides: "Every-
one shall have the right to protection of his health."1 ' The follow-
ing two articles are in a similar aspirational vein."' Inclusion of
such obviously unenforceable, affirmative constitutional duties en-
courages citizens to regard the constitution as an aspirational doc-
ument rather than a serious limitation on governmental powers.
109. Id. at 9.
110. Id. at 9-10.
111. For example, Brazil's previous Constitution prohibited divorce, which was not le-
gally permissible until adoption of constitutional amendment No. 9 on June 28, 1977. Arti-
cle CXCII, section 3 of Brazil's 1988 Constitution prohibits charging an annual real rate of
interest in excess of 12%. This provision has never been enforced; indeed, its enforcement
would paralyze both public and private sector lending activities in Brazil. For an overview of
this recent constitution, large parts of which have never been enforced, see Rosenn, Brazil's
New Constitution: An Exercise in Transient Constitutionalism for a Transitional Society,
38 Am. J. CoMP. L. 773 (1990).
112. VENEZ. CONST. of 1961, art. LXXVI. The Brazilian Constitution contains a similar
provision. BRAz. CONST. of 1988, art. CXCVI.
113. VENEZ. CONST. of 1961, art. LXXVII provides: "The State shall strive to improve
the living conditions of the rural population." Art. LXXVIII states: "Everyone has the right
to an education."
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E. Difficulties in Developing Procedural Institutions to
Check Abuses of Executive Power
Latin America has been slow in developing institutions to
check the arbitrary abuse of executive power. The Iberian
monarchs were absolutist, particularly with respect to the colonies,
which were regarded as royal patrimony. No counterpart to the
Magna Carta had established the principle that the king is beneath
the law.1" Legislatures, particularly in this century, have usually
been weak and dominated by the executive.
Latin American judiciaries have generally lacked real indepen-
dence. 115 Latin America is heir to the civil law tradition, in which
the judge is more a career civil servant than an independent politi-
cal force. While most Latin American constitutions attempt to pro-
tect judicial independence, these guarantees have frequently been
ineffective because of a lack of a deep seated societal commitment
to the value of a truly independent judiciary.
Although most Latin American constitutions explicitly provide
for judicial review, the courts have often lacked procedural devices
for effectively checking abuses of governmental power. Moreover,
judges that have courageously dared to exercise the power of judi-
cial review to protect individual rights and the rule of law have
often personally discovered the inefficacy of constitutional guaran-
tees of life tenure for the judiciary in the wake of executive domi-
nation." 8 Nor have guarantees of press freedom been an effective
check; censorship, closure during states of siege, withholding news-
print subsidies, and intimidation have been common techniques to
mute governmental criticism.
114. During the 12th century, the Spanish kingdom of Arag6n created an institution
called the Justice of Arag6n. (Oftentimes, the national designation "of Arag6n," was pre-
ceded by titular names, such as juez supremo, juez mayor, and juez media.) The Justice,
who was the chief judge of the king's court, was responsible for protecting citizens from
arbitrary governmental action in violation of the fueros, quasi-constitutional charters in
which the king granted rights and legal privileges to various corporate groups and munici-
palities. The Justice could issue writs analogous to habeas corpus and could grant stays to
protect lives and property. During the 15th century the office became hereditary, and the
Justice's ability to curb royal arbitrariness declined sharply. R. GIESEY, IF NOT, NOT: THE
OATH OF THE ARAGONESE AND THE LEGENDARY LAWS OF THE SOBRARBE 65-68 (1968). The
Justice's independence disappeared completely under King Phillip II, who in 1592 beheaded
the Justice "in circumstances reflecting little credit on that monarch." E. VAN KLEFFENS,
HISPANIC LAW UNTIL THE END OF THE MIDDLE AGES 243 n.1 (1968).
115. See generally Rosenn, The Protection of Judicial Independence in Latin
America, 19 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 1, 23-35 (1987).
116. Id. at 27-28.
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F. Failures of Economic Integration
Latin America has been largely unsuccessful in creating com-
mon markets.'17 Simon Bolivar's Congress of American States in
1816 was the first attempt, but Bolivar's vision of a united Latin
American republic vaporized in incessant political squabbling. De-
spite several attempts at economic union in Central America, none
has been very successful. The Central American Common Market
(CACM), the latest effort, has been in a state of crisis since 1969,
when the so-called "soccer war" broke out between El Salvador
and Honduras. The Latin American Free Trade Association, cre-
ated by the Treaty of Montevideo in 1960, and its successor, the
Latin American Integration Association, created by the Treaty of
Montevideo of 1980, have had only limited success in reducing
trade barriers. The Andean Pact, a subregional integration group
formed in 1969, splintered with Chile's 1976 withdrawal and has
been plagued by serious problems. It has recently rewritten basic
provisions to authorize the widespread prior disregard of its trade
and investment restrictions.' The latest effort at regional integra-
tion, Mercosur, was formed in March 1991 by Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay, and Uruguay." 9
G. The Persistence of Militarism
From inception, Latin America has been plagued with milita-
rism. " O The Wars of Independence dragged on for a decade longer
in Latin America than in the United States. Even before the Span-
ish armies were finally defeated, the "liberating" armies began to
turn on the liberated. As Professor Johnson put it, "Armies be-
came permanent and also the permanent enemies of the people."''
117. See generally Tomassini, The Disintegration of the Integration Process: Towards
New Forms of Regional Cooperation, in REGIONAL INTEGRATION: THE LATIN AMERICAN EXPE-
RIENCE 210 (A. Gauhared ed. 1985); Integration, 37 CEPAL REV. 79 (Apr. 1989); Blejer,
Regional Integration in Latin America: Experience and Outlook, 3 J. INT'L EcoN. INTEG. 10
(Aug. 1988).
118. Esquirol, Foreign Investment: Revision of the Andean Foreign Investment Code,
29 HARV. INT'L L.J. 169-77 (1988); Comment, The Andean Pact's Foreign Investment Code
Decision 220: An Agreement to Disagree, 20 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 649 (1989).
119. LATIN AM. WEEKLY REP., Apr. 4, 1991, at 1.
120. J. JOHNSON, THE MILITARY AND SOCIETY IN LATIN AMERICA 178 (1964). Initially, this
was not true for Brazil, whose independence from Portugal was achieved without bloodshed
in 1822. Brazil achieved more than six decades of stability under a constitutional monarchy
that lasted until 1889, when the armed forces overthrew it. Id.
121. Id. at 25.
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Since 1823, when the Peruvians adopted the first constitution to
accept the principle, 122 standing armies have become an accepted
and permanent feature of Latin American political life. Analysts
have estimated that, prior to 1850, allocations to these armies con-
sumed more than half the annual budgets of the new Latin Ameri-
can republics.1'3 Latin America's initial experience with self-gov-
ernment was characterized by extraconstitutional seizures of power
by caudi1los'2 " and military officers that kept the region in a state
of constant political turmoil. Once loosed, the genie of militarism is
extraordinarily reluctant to return to the bottle. Only Costa Rica,
which abolished its army in 1948, has successfully resolved the di-
lemma of ensuring civilian control over the military.121 It is no co-
incidence that Costa Rica has the best record in Latin America for
adherence to constitutional government. Despite the fact that over
the last century the military in other countries have considered
themselves professional and therefore outside the political forum,
Latin American militaries still consider political intervention their
proper role."2 6 Furthermore, so do important, civilian groups, who
not only expect, but actively foment military intervention to oust
ineffective civilian regimes. A Dominican army officer, in comment-
ing upon the military's temporary detention of the chief opposition
candidate shortly before the 1974 election, concisely stated the
problem: "La Constituci6n es una cosa; los militares somos otra"
(The Constitution is one thing; we soldiers are another).'
2 7
H. Lack of a Widespread Economic Payoff
Latin America has not had the degree of political and eco-
nomic success experienced by the United States and other devel-
oped economies. Moreover, in most Latin American countries, a
122. Id. at 33.
123. Id. at 49.
124. Id. at 39.
125. See id. at 120.
126. Mexico is also a special case. By the 1940s, Mexico's political leaders were strong
enough to remove the revolutionary army from political participation and commit it to pro-
fessional pursuits. Stevens, Mexico in the 1980s: From Authoritarianism to Power Sharing?,
in LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT 403, 419 (H. Wiarda & H. Kline 2d ed.
1985). Mexico's army has thus far remained co-opted by the political system, but there is
evidence that the political role of the Mexican army is increasing in recent years in the wake
of economic crisis and political unrest. See Ronfeldt, The Modern Mexican Military, in
ARMIES AND POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA 224, 232-41 (A. Lowenthal & J. Fitch eds. 1986).
127. Lowenthal, Preface, ARMIES AND POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA 3 (A. Lowenthal ed.
1976).
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small elite earns the lion's share of national income. Constitutions
are much more difficult to maintain if they fail to deliver a wide-
spread economic payoff. Economic success and constitutional suc-
cess are interrelated. In ancient times, men buried their gold dur-
ing times of revolution. In Latin American countries beset by
frequent coups, capital is salted away in foreign bank accounts and
real estate. Latin America desperately needs more capital, particu-
larly capital that is channeled into productive investment rather
than capital in the form of loans to governments enabling them to
assemble even larger bureaucracies. Yet, the failure to provide an
institutional framework that secures a high degree of compliance
with law and security for personal liberties and private property
only exacerbates the basic task of producing economic prosperity.
VI. CONCLUSION
The failure of constitutionalism in Latin America cannot be
cured by changing constitutional language alone. Despite the long-
standing belief in Latin America that constitutions and laws can
perform magic only if they are drafted properly, history offers
compelling evidence that effective democracies cannot be produced
by simply adopting democratic constitutions.
Latin America is still struggling with the issue of what kind of
constitutions should be adopted. Constitutions are not panaceas
that can cure unresolved fundamental social, economic, and politi-
cal problems. Unfortunately, any democratic constitutional model
is not likely to succeed until the dominant political elites agree to
abide by the outcomes of honest elections and to create a political
climate in which political power can genuinely alternate between
or among the parties. Nor is constitutionalism likely to work well
in Latin America until governmental power becomes less concen-
trated and centralized in the executive branch, and the underlying
conflict between democracy and authoritarianism is resolved.
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APPENDIX A
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE TWENTY LATIN AMERICAN REPUBLICS




1. Constitution of 1819
2. Fundamental Law of 1824











4. Constitution of 1853a
5. Constitution of 1949
BOLIVIA2
Total 15
9. Constitution of 1871
10. Constitution of 1878
11. Constitution of 1880
12. Constitution of 1938
13. Constitution of 1947c
14. Constitution of 1961




The Modern Argentine Republic did not technically come into being until c. 1826.
Before that, it would more properly be characterized as a city-state centered in Buenos
Aires and surrounded by other lesser ones.
















5. Constitution of 1946
6. Constitution of 1967
7. Constitution of 1 9 6 9 d










1. Act of Federation of
United Provinces of
New Granada 1811
2. Constitution of 1821
3. Organic Decree of 1828
4. Constitution of 1830
5. Fundamental Law for
New Granada of 1831
6. Constitution of 1832
7. Constitution of 1843
Total 12




10. Pact of Union of United
States of Colombia of 1861
11. Constitution of United
States of Columbia
of 1863
12. Constitution of 1886
d Formally labelled Amendment No. 1, but redrafted the entire 1967 Constitution
1810-1812 - Provisional government
1812 - Spaniards retake and expel O'Higgins
1817 - Chilean victory over Spanish and beginning of true independence
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COSTA RICA
Independence 1821







Constitution of 1901 i  4.
Constitution of 1928 5.










































Constitution of Jan. 1929








h Part of Central America Conference




































































Constitutional Act of 1851
Constitution of 1876





Fundamental Law of 1982
Constitution of 1985
J Reinstated in 1938
k Reinstated in 1972
1 Reinstated in 1970
m Part of Central American Conference
n Reinstated es modified in 1944
0 Part of Central American Conference
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6. Constitution of 1856
7. Constitution of 1857
8. Constitution of 1917
P Part of Central America Conference
q Reinstated in 1908
r Reinstated in 1846









































9. Constitution of 1939
10. Constitution of 1948
11. Constitution of 1950
12. Constitution of 1974
13. Fundamental Law &
Statute of Rights of
1979
14. Constitution of 1986
PANAMA
Total 4
3. Constitution of 1946
4. Constitution of 1972
PARAGUAY
Total 5
4. Constitution of 1940















t Part of Central America Conference
u United States of Central America
v Reinstated in 1827
W Separate Constitutions in effect from March to August for North Peru and South
Peru




























































Y Republic of Colombia
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12 9/30, 6/43, 2/44, 9/55, 11/55, 3/62,
6/66, 6/70, 3/71, 3/76, 12/81, 6/82
18 6/30, 11/34, 5/36, 7/37, 12/43, 8/46,
5/51, 4/52, 11/64, 9/69, 10/70 (2),
8/71, 7/78, 11/78, 11/79, 7/80, 7/82
6 10/30, 10/45, 8/54, 11/55, 4/64, 8/69
6 7/31, 6/32, 9/32, 10/32 (2), 9/73
2 6/53, 5/57
1 5/48
4 8/33, 9/33, 3/52, 1/59
5 2/30, 5/61, 1/62, 9/63, 4/65
15 8/31, 10/31, 8/32, 8/35, 9/35, 10/37,
5/44, 8/48, 9/47, 11/61, 7/63, 3/66,
6/70, 2/72, 1/76
7 12/31, 5/44, 12/48, 1/49, 10/60, 1/61,
10/79
11 12/30, 7/44, 10/44, 6/54, 10/57, 3/63,
2/72, 1/76, 3/82, 6/82, 8/83
10 1/46, 5/50, 12/56, 2/57, 4/57, 5/57,
6/57, 2/86, 6/88, 9/88
6 12/54, 10/56, 10/63, 12/72, 4/75, 8/78
3 6/36, 5/47, 7/79
10 2/31, 10/41, 11/49, 1/55, 10/68, 7/82,
2/84, 9/85, 2/88, 12/89
10 4/33, 2/36, 10/36, 8/37, 6/48, 1/49,
2/49, 9/49, 5/54, 2/89
7 8/30, 3/31, 10/48, 7/62, 3/63, 10/68,
8/75
2 4/33, 7/73
4 10/45, 11/48, 12/52, 1/58
